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CASE NOTES
Ohio shortly after the principal decision in Illinois. There the plaintiff sought
to have a release set aside on the ground that he believed it was one relating
only to claims for property damage, although the agreement clearly stated
it was a full release of "all claims . . and causes of action on account
of injuries resulting from collision of motor vehicles."° The court, however,
rejected plaintiff's claim and held the general release could not be set aside on
such grounds. It would appear that the plaintiff would have been more
successful if he had sought to have the release wholly set aside for the reason
that injuries developed which could not have been known at the time the
release was signed thereby rendering the $59.50 settlement inequitable.
While the Ohio court narrowly confined its decision to the point that it
would not allow a general release to be overcome by the allegation of the
suing party that the settlement was for property damage alone, it is possible
that if the plaintiff had sought to have the release set aside on the suggested
grounds, the court would have followed its decision in Connolley v. United
States Steel Company, 7
 in which it stated, "Where one injured in an accident
reads and understands the contract of settlement and release, signs the con-
tract for a valid consideration, and makes no claim that the contract was
procured by fraud, and makes no application to set it aside, he is bound by
its terms . . . ."8
In the light of this language, the Ohio court might have been disposed
to reach a decision similar to that in the principal case.
The true impact of the Ruggles case is felt by a prospective defendant
who in an out-of-court settlement seeks a release in the most comprehensive
terms. In considering his position, it must be borne in mind that as a
practical proposition, releases are rarely attacked because of after-discovered
injuries.
In Ruggles, the court scrupulously confined itself to the facts before it.
It is possible that given a material change in the facts, the settlement would
not have been found so unfair as to be unconscionable. Since the facts
weigh so heavily it is difficult to formulate a definitive rule on the basis of
the case. In this, as in other areas of equity jurisdiction, a court must trust
more to the application of its discretion to the facts given, than to the appli-
cation of a strict and stable line of precedent.
SHEILA M. MCCUE
Copyright Protection of Original Designs—Absence of Statutory No-
tice.—Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.'—The plaintiff,
Peter Pan Fabrics Inc., engaged in the business of purchasing uncolored
cloth, printing designs upon it, and reselling the finished cloth to dress
Id. at 529, 166 N.E.2d at 757.
7 161 Ohio St. 448, 119 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
8 Id. at 451, 119 N.E.2d at 847.
1 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)
(L. Hand, J., Friendly, J. dissenting), 73 Harv, L. Rev. 1613.
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manufacturers, purchased an original painting called "Byzantium" from a
Paris studio, reproduced the design on cloth, and registered it with the
copyright office as a "work of art." Each repetition of the design bore the
statutory copyright notice on the selvage (edge) of the cloth.
Purchasers of cloth, in the process of manufacturing it into dresses,
either cut off the notice-bearing edge or sew it into the seams. Thus, at best,
the copyright notice can be found only by turning the dress inside out and
examining the seams.
The defendant, also a fabric converter, purchased a dress manufactured
from the "Byzantium" fabric, used it as a model for a similar design, making
deliberate but slight variations in its details, and offered its fabric in com-
petition with Peter Pan at a lower price.
In the Federal District Court (S.D.N.Y.), the plaintiff sought and
obtained an injunction restraining the defendant from copying the design. 2
The defendant appealed on two grounds: that its design was not sufficiently
similar to "Byzantium" to constitute infringement and, in the alternative,
that the plaintiff forfeited its copyright because of the absence of notice on
the finished garments, the form in which the cloth was ultimately sold and
used.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided court, holding that
the defendant's fabric infringed the copyright because the aesthetic appeal
of the two fabrics was the same. On the issue of invalidation (forfeiture), it
was held that the defendant failed to sustain the burden of proof of inade-
quate notice of copyright.
The dress fashion industry has long been seeking some effective means
of protection against design piracy. The common law copyright, which was
lost immediately upon general publication of the copyrighted article, and
the protection afforded against the tort of unfair competition, usually
restricted to palming off, proved quite inadequate. 3 The economic life of
dress fashions being usually limited to one season, protection afforded by
design patents is impractical because, to acquire such, a considerable
amount of time is required for examination for novelty and search through
prior registrations. However, the copyright statutes do afford some
measure of protection to fabric designs as either works of art or prints. 4
The doubt as to whether utilitarian art is within the purview of the Copy-
right Act was resolved in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in Mazer v.
Stein. 5
Statutory copyright offers the fabric designer the advantage of simple
2 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co., 173 F. Supp. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
3 See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 US. 728 (1930). See generally, Protection of Styles and Designs in the, Garment
Industry, 26 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 86 (1957) ; Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 Ind. L.J. 235
(1944).
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 5g (reproductions of works of art), 5k (prints and pictorial
illustrations) (19.58); Peter Pan Fabrics Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), 34 Notre Dame Law. 457.
5 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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registration procedures.° No search is made of prior registrations, there
being no requirement that the work be novel. It may be a new expression
of a design already in the public domain.' However, a copyright protects
only the designer's expression, not the ideas which the expression contains.
The protection afforded is against copying only° and a plurality of valid
copyrights of an identical expression is possible if the proprietors have
independently arrived at it.° Although protection extends beyond a mere
photographic reproduction of the design, the tests for infringement are at
best nebulous. The court in the instant case, in determining the extent of
protection, considered the use for which the work was intended and the
scrutiny ordinary observers would give it. The test applied was whether the
aesthetic appeal of the two fabrics was sufficiently similar to constitute
infringement. 10
Notice as a condition of copyright protection first appeared in federal
legislation in 1502. 11 Prior to the present Act of 1909, a copyright was
secured only by filing a title in the Copyright Office and depositing copies
prior to publication. The present Section 10 changed the procedure to
permit the copyright to be secured by the act of publishing a work with the
appropriate notice affixed to the copies. 12
The omission of the notice on the initial or subsequent publication
by the proprietor or with his authority results in a forfeiture of the copy-
right." Moreover, notice which is defective in failing to follow the literal
form specified in the statute will result in a forfeiture, 14 unless the proprietor
can bring himself within the protection of the accident or mistake section
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 10 (publication with notice), § 11 (registration of claim)
(1958), See generally Seidel, What the General Practitioner Should Know About
Trademarks and Copyrights 117-24 (ALI 1957).
7 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951)
(Frank, J.).
8 Id. at 103.
9 Id. at 103 (dictum).
10 Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., supra note 2. Compare Millworth
Converting Corporation v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960). A different test for
infringement is applied to a fabric design already in the public domain. The area
of protection for such a copyright is more restricted than that afforded an original
design because the public is entitled to use "all that went before", including the
proprietor's contribution. The public may use the general patterns, but it may not
use the proprietor's original and distinctive variations. In the Millworth case the
plaintiff photographed an embroidered design and reproduced it on a flat fabric,
creating a three dimensional effect. There was no infringement because the defendant's
copy failed to achieve the three dimensional effect.
11 U.S. Copyright Office, General Revision of the Copyright Law, Study No. 6,
Notice of Copyright 1 (1958).
12 Id. at 7.
13 Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1941).
14 Louis Dejonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33 (1914) (Holmes,
J.); Deward & Rich v. Bristol Savings & Loan Corp., 120 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1941).
But compare E. M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 279 F.2d .555 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Per curiam, Friendly, J. dissenting).
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of the statute.' 5 However, even in such instance there must be some step
toward compliance. 16
 Notice which is intentionally defective does not come
within the protection of Section 21 of the Copyright Act." But once the
plaintiff has shown that he has obtained a valid copyright, the burden of
proof on the issue of invalidation is on the defendant.' 8 Although bills
have been proposed on numerous occasions since 1909, which would have
either dispensed with notice as a condition of copyright or liberalized the
notice provisions, none have been adopted by Congress.'°
The copyright problems of the dress fabric industry were not in the
contemplation of Congress when the present Act was drafted. The Court
in the instant case, called upon to apply the statute in a relatively new
context, liberally construed the statutory provision for the omission of notice
by accident or mistake to cover the case where the notice was concealed
from the final user to prevent the destruction of the product's market value.
The burden was placed on the deliberate copyist to prove that notice
could have been embodied in the design without impairing its market
value.20 The court departed from the trend of prior decisions and rejected
the analogy of the publication cases. 21 The consequence is a result contrary
to the registration regulations of the Copyright Office.22 The Court has
in effect liberalized the statutory notice requirements where Congress has
refused to do so.
Concededly, the dress manufacturers are, in one sense, the consumers
of the fabric and are put on notice that a copyright exists, with means of
identifying the copyright owner. Yet no such notice is provided the general
public and an injunction will lie even against an innocent infringer. 23 It
might be argued that the court has merely decided what is necessary to
support the grant of a preliminary injunction. However, the preliminary
15 17 U.S.C. ; 21 (1958): "Where the copyright proprietor has sought to comply
with the provisions of this title with respect to notice, the omission by accident or
mistake of the prescribed notice from a particular copy or copies shall not invalidate
the copyright...."
18 National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 601
(2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, 3.).
17 Advertisers Exchange Inc. v. Anderson, 144 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Cf.
Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
18 Modern Aids, Inc. v. R. H. Macy and Co., 264 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1959) (L.
Hand, J.),
19
 U.S. Copyright Office, Study No. 6, supra note 11, at 54.
20 Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., supra note 2.
21 Id. at 491 (dissenting opinion).
22 37 C.F.R. $ 202.2(b)(7) (Supp. 1959): "(b) Defects in notice. Where the
copyright notice does not meet the requirements of the law, the Copyright Office will
reject an application for copyright registration. Common defects in the notice include,
among others the following: . (7) A notice is permanently covered so that it cannot
be seen without tearing the work apart . . ."
23
 Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Company, 283 U,S. 191, 198 (1931).
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injunction decides the issue between the parties because the limited life of
the design renders further litigation economically unfeasible. 24
Despite any inconsistency with prior case law and regulations, the
result reached seems to be in accord with the economic philosophy behind
the copyright law: "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."25
WILLIAM P. SULLIVAN
Corporations—Dissolution—Shareholder Deadlock.—Jach-son v. Nicolai-
Neppacb Co. 1—Plaintiff, fifty per cent owner of defendant corporation's
outstanding stock, occupied one seat on the three-man board of directors,
the other two directors being the owners of the balance of the shares. To
secure equal representation on the board, plaintiff sought to amend the by-
laws to increase the number of directors to four. A shareholder deadlock
developed over the proposed amendment and as a result of the impasse the
plaintiff brings an action to dissolve the corporation. 2 The Supreme Court
of Oregon affirmed the dismissal of the suit. HELD: The plaintiff must estab-
lish that a dissolution will be beneficial to the shareholders.
Because continuity of existence is one of the fundamental differences
between corporations and other associations, courts have refused to assume
jurisdiction of petitions for dissolution where such remedy has not been
provided by statute. 3 While there are jurisdictions which believe that a
court of equity has inherent power to liquidate and wind up the affairs of
a corporation,4 even in such jurisdictions an allegation of a shareholder
24 H. M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., supra note 12, at 557 (dissenting
opinion).
23 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
1 348 P.2d 9 (Oregon 1959).
2 No contention was made by plaintiff that the corporation had not thrived under
its present management, nor was it urged that she had been denied a voice in manage-
ment or that her interests had been injured in any way. Plaintiff's evidence was directed
at showing an inability to elect any new directors at four successive annual meetings.
Suit was brought under Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.595(1) (a)(c) (1957): "(1) The circuit
courts shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation; (a) In
an action by a shareholder when it is established-  (c) that the shareholders are
locked in voting power, and have failed, for a period which includes at least two con-
secutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired
or would have expired upon the election of their successors; . . ."
3 Alabama Coal & Coke Co. v. Shackelford, 137 Ala. 224, 34 So. 833 (1903); Wall
& Beaver Street Corp. v. Munson Line, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1943); Lush'us
Brand Distributors, Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 330 I11. App. 216, 70 N.E.2d
737 (1946); Wallace v. Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co., 101 Iowa 313, 70 N.W. 216 (1897);
Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Ore. 70, 96 P. 528 (1908).
See also Ballantine, Corporations § 304 (1946) ; 16 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., §1 8077,
8080 (perm, ed. 1942).
4 Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 217 P. 301 (1923);
Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1933); Guaranty
Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okl. 185, 191 P.2d 975 (1948).
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